The Battle of Jutland

Why the North Sea was Important

The Battle of Jutland took place in the North Sea off the peninsula of Denmark. The North Sea was a critical location for the British to control because of the shipping lanes that ran through the area. Early in the war, the UK and France set up a Naval blockade against Germany, making resources scarce on the home front. The Germans wanted to reciprocate. Should the Germans have been able to capture these lanes, they could have turned the tide and created a crisis on the Western Front, as the British depended on shipping lanes in the North Sea for foreign aid and transportation of troops. With Germany isolated on the continent, they were able to trade with neutral countries and deliver supplies to their troops. In addition, a lack of provisions would eventually starve Britain and her soldiers, allowing the German military to advance. As a result, the blockade and subsequent command of the North Sea were integral to the success of the war. In fact, “the whole basic British strategy… was to subject Germany to a distant blockade… This could only be achieved by British command of the sea” (Warships 103). It was both sides’ desire for control and, subsequently, sufficient resources that led to the Battle of Jutland.  

The Outcome

Over a century later, historians are still debating which fleet won. Casualties and loss of ships point to a German victory. British casualties were undoubtedly higher than the Germans’. Although the Germans’ initial reporting was conservative, once corrected, the British still lost more men during the battle. Estimates for British casualties range from 6,768 (Massie 665) to 6,945, and it is widely agreed upon that German casualties total 3,058 (Stille 72). This disparity is attributed to the prevalence of flashes in the Grand fleet. The British, in the Battle of Jutland, had five ships blow up due to flashes, specifically due to Britain’s habit of storing the propellant in silk bags near magazines, and leaving the doors open to the magazine stores to increase the rate of firing. (King 156) If hit, the propellant would create a distinctive flash that would ignite the magazines, potentially causing a massive explosion. Extremely harmful to the Grand fleet, the High Seas Fleet had learned the importance of safety measures to protect from flashes at a previous battle, Dogger Bank. “Thus, at Jutland, powder exploded and fires wiped out turret crews on Derfflinger and other ships, but… the ships did not blow up” (Massie 667). It is because of these flashes that we can see the number of casualties mirrored in the tonnage of ships lost, where the British lost 111,000 tons and the Germans lost 62,000 tons. (Warships 103). 

However, these statistics are only one way of measuring success in a battle. In terms of goals achieved, and when the fleets were ready to sail again, the British prevailed. “[Jellicoe’s] primary object was to retain command of the sea, and his second was to annihilate the High Seas Fleet” (Warships 103). After the battle, the British did “retain command of the sea”. It is neutralization that can be argued. Post battle, each of the Admirals gave a report on when their fleet could sail again. “Jellicoe was able to signal the Admiralty at 2145 hours on June 2 that the Grand Fleet was at four hours’ notice for steam and ready for action. Scheer, in his report to the Kaiser, gave the middle of August” (Warships 106). Considering the Grand Fleet was larger, the damage done to the fleet was important but not debilitating, whereas the damage done to the High Seas Fleet put it out of commission for at least two months, and it would mostly stay in port for the rest of the war. In this way, it could be said that the Grand Fleet effectively neutralized the High Seas Fleet.  

Looking at Scheer’s goals, he attempted “to isolate a portion of the Grand Fleet and to bring it to action against superior force, but he was determined at all costs to avoid action with the fleet as a whole” (Warships 103). Initially, Scheer managed to make contact with a subsection of the Grand Fleet; however, by ignoring reports that a force was seen closer than he estimated Jellicoe to be, little of the battle was fought before the Grand Fleet reunited. Therefore, Scheer barely achieved his first goal and failed his second. Because of this, depending on what each historian values most as deciding factors in naval battles, it can be argued that either side won, or that the battle was a draw. This is seen directly following the battle, when ignoring the context and focusing on the tonnage of ships lost and casualties, the Germans spun the battle as a victory. Soon after, the Germans’ reports were published in Great Britain. “London newsboys were on the streets shouting, ‘Great naval disaster! Five British battleships lost!’… Overseas,… headlines read, ‘Britain Defeated at Sea!’ ‘British Losses Great!’ ‘British Fleet Almost Annihilated!’” (Massie 660). Naturally, these headlines shocked British citizens. Winston Churchill, the Prime Minister, sought to calm the public. To do so, he put the statistics of the battle in greater context. “He brought out the crucial fact that the High Seas Fleet had escaped destruction only by flight. He stressed that sea control depended on dreadnought battleships and that British supremacy in this respect was unimpaired” (Massie 662). He also stated that the loss of British ships “was regrettable, but far from crippling” (Massie 662).  

In hindsight, we can see the Germans excluded key context of the battle to frame the outcome as a victory, whereas the British leaned heavily on context to discredit the German reports. Churchill would continue to write on this topic, specifically in his multivolume work The World Crisis. Volume three, published in 1927, has two chapters dedicated to the battle. Within these chapters, Churchill discusses Jellicoe’s reasons for trying to avoid confrontation, stating “All he [Jellicoe] knew was that a complete victory would not improve decisively an already favorable naval situation, and that a total defeat would lose the war” (Churchill 105). Or, as Churchill also said, “Jellicoe was the only man on either side who could lose the war in an afternoon” (King 154). Combined, these two quotes paint a picture of the British naval position in mid-1916. Addressing Jellicoe as the only man who could lose the war, while taking into account that a victory would not improve their situation, points to the British navy occupying the best possible position in the North Sea for the allies. This also speaks to the importance of the shipping lanes running through said sea and the potential consequences if they had been captured.  

Due to the discrepancies in reports, it was not long before the Germans realized they would have to publish a more accurate account of the battle. “On June 7, the German Naval Staff was forced to reveal its additional losses” (Massie 659). Scheer soon realized that a fleet battle with the British would not yield his desired outcome. Still hopeful to slowly weaken the British forces, “Scheer told the emperor that ‘a victorious end to the war within a reasonable time can only be achieved through the defeat of British economic life– that is, by using U-boats against British trade” (Massie 659). Nevertheless, Scheer still had a fleet of ships under his command, which he attempted to use three more times before the war ended. Failing to resurrect his Sunderland operation, the High Seas Fleet was brought back to port, and “there they lay, rusting and crewed by mutineers, when the war ended on November 11, 1918” (Massie 684).  

Conclusion

For such a complex battle, historians generally agree that neither the British nor the Germans won outright. However, the Battle of Jutland was still a major turning point in the war and the history of Naval warfare as we know it. Still studied today, primarily as a result of its unexpected results, the unprecedented confrontation was both a beginning and an end. The battle was the beginning of a new era of naval technology. “Germany’s naval technology was proved by Jutland to be superior to Britain’s. Her ships were stronger, her guns more accurate, her ordnance more destructive” (Keegan 175). The battles consisting of sails, wooden ships, and cannon balls were officially relegated to the past in favor of aiming systems, boiler rooms, and anti-aircraft guns. Additionally, the battle was also the end of Britain’s unparalleled naval supremacy. No longer was British victory a guarantee. Fundamentally changing the way naval battles were fought and thought of, the Battle of Jutland may not have a clear winner, but it has left a lasting legacy on the history of the First World War and of the British Empire.